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Land Release Liability
Who should be responsible for any adverse events after clearance? The process of transferring 
liability from an operator to the state seems biased due to an inherent conflict of interest.
by Sean Moorhouse [ Mine Action Consulting ]
If a mine/explosive remnant of war (ERW) accident occurs in previously released land, who is liable for the damage caused? This is a question that many national mine action 
authorities (NMAA) ask and one that I was asked in Laos and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina during two recent workshops on liability 
in mine action, which were facilitated by the Geneva Interna-
tional Centre on Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) 
The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) guide 
mine action organizations by establishing principles and spec-
ifying international requirements in mine action. IMAS 07.11, 
Amendment No. 2, released 1 March 2013, contains important 
elements that help point the way toward answering questions 
on liability. Moreover, the amendment raises a few additional 
questions of its own, which require answers if IMAS is to be 
thoroughly implemented.
Land Release Clarification
Known for being difficult to translate into languages oth-
er than English, the term land release has become problematic 
over the years. In addition, although most people in the mine 
action community have a good understanding of land release, 
many continue to conflate land release (land determined as be-
ing safe to use) with land cancellation (land never contaminat-
ed). Combining the two concepts into one can cause confusion. 
Land release—an evidence-based threat assessment de-
termining where full clearance is or is not required—is only 
concerned with increasing the efficiency of mine action activi-
ties. Like anything in the dynamic world of mine action, land 
release is subject to constant refinements, which explains why 
the latest IMAS 07.11 came into being.
The new IMAS 07.11 describes land release as “… an ev-
idence-based decision-making process that helps determine 
with confidence which land needs further action and which 
does not. It involves the identification of hazardous areas, the 
cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduc-
tion of land through technical survey and the clearance of 
land with actual mine/ERW contamination.”1
What happens when released land is found to contain 
an unexploded device or an explosion occurs? IMAS 07.11 
uses the term adverse event to describe such incidents. 
Unfortunately, these adverse events will occur from time 
to time. Although perfection is the goal, it cannot always 
be achieved; some mines/ERW might be missed during the 
clearance process.
IMAS 07.11 contains three key elements that determine li-
ability in the event that any adverse event occurs:
•	 Reasonable effort
•	 Residual risk
•	 Transfer of liability from operator to state
IMAS 07.11 describes all reasonable effort as “… a minimum 
acceptable level of effort to identify and document contami-
nated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/
ERW. ‘All reasonable effort’ has been applied when the com-
This 13-year-old Sri Lankan boy lost his foot while working in 
his family’s garden after the area was partially cleared.
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mitment of additional resources is considered to be unreason-
able in relation to the results expected.”1
NMAA should define what actions and parameters make 
up all reasonable effort for the different processes concerned. 
For example, in areas where clearance is deemed necessary, 
national standards determine a minimum clearance depth 
and target size for clearance. For metal detectors, the target 
size is determined as the smallest piece of metal the detector 
must be able to find, to represent the signal of the mines/ERW 
being cleared. For animal detection systems, it is the smallest 
explosive trace.
The second element, residual risk, is unavoidable. A re-
sidual risk of encountering mines/ERW in any post-conf lict 
country will always exist, yet with every item found and 
destroyed, risk is reduced (albeit not entirely eliminated). 
Even in manually cleared areas, using all reasonable—or 
even unreasonable—effort, a chance always remains that an 
item was missed. Mine action’s goal is to reduce that risk to 
a tolerably low level. Each NMAA must determine its own 
risk-tolerance level.
The third and final element is the transfer of liability from 
the operator to the state. IMAS defines liability as “… any le-
gal responsibility, duty or obligation that a country, organisa-
tion or individual may have. Liability in relation to an adverse 
event, such as an accident or the discovery of a missed item in 
an area, is normally linked to non-compliance with an agreed 
policy or procedure.”1
Transfer of Liability
IMAS 07.11 assumes the operator is liable for any dam-
ages that may occur during clearance—which, although un-
derstandable, seems a little unfair. After all, the operator was 
not responsible for placing mines/ERW in the area. Worse, if 
the clearance organization had not taken all of the physical 
risks involved in clearing the devices, it would have assumed 
no liability and the land would still be contaminated. Yet in 
deciding to clear the devices—whether for profit or humani-
tarian purposes—the operator effectively becomes liable for 
any damages caused during clearance.
IMAS clarifies that the operator is liable if an accident oc-
curs during the operation, but at what point does the state as-
sume liability? In areas with no evidence of contamination, 
land is released to the community without executing any 
technical survey or full clearance. The non-technical survey 
process is specified according to national standards, imple-
mented by the operator and quality managed by NMAA. Is 
there any difference in the operator’s liability if an adverse 
event occurs in an area released without being processed?2
When land is released, regardless of the method used, a 
formal handover process should take place where the operator 
relinquishes liability to NMAA, an agent of the state. There-
fore, the responsibility should immediately transfer to the 
state when a formal handover process occurs. Additionally, li-
ability handover should be a clearly and explicitly identified 
moment in time.
On the other hand, NMAA may wish to delay this 
handover for as long as possible, so that the operator retains 
liability. This delaying tactic should not be allowed, because 
if there are concerns about the quality of the work, NMAA 
would require that the operator solve the problems and 
certify the work’s completion.
Holding an Operator Liable
However, IMAS 07.11 states that an operator will, at least in 
principle, retain some liability in cases of incidents caused by 
suspected missed mines/ERW in four circumstances. Specifi-
cally, some liability is retained if an investigation shows that
“i) the accident was caused by wilful or criminal mis-
conduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct or a con-
scious, f lagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the 
individual(s) harmed;
ii) the organisation was not properly accredited, licensed, 
certified or authorised to carry out acts leading to the errone-
ous land release decision;
iii) the organisation wilfully infringed prevailing national 
policy or standards;
iv) the organisation had conducted gross procedural errors 
or grossly deviated from an agreed land release concept.”1
A mine was found and marked in an area declared clear of 
mines in Sri Lanka.
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While these conditions on liability 
transfer make sense in theory, they do 
not in practice. Although IMAS 07.11 
does not specify which organization 
would be responsible for conducting an 
investigation into any adverse event af-
ter land release, in practice, the relevant 
NMAA would be responsible. This cre-
ates an inherent conflict of interest, as 
NMAA is one of the parties that could 
be found at fault in any investigation. 
Therefore, it should not be investigat-
ing itself.
The State Must Accept Responsibility
A potential way around this conflict 
of interest would be to have a suprana-
tional body, perhaps the United Nations 
Mine Action Service or GICHD, that 
would be responsible for investigating 
Mines found after clearance create risks for local residents.
adverse events worldwide. Currently, 
this is unlikely to happen. Until it does, 
the humanitarian mine action commu-
nity is left with the uncomfortable sta-
tus quo of NMAA determining whether 
it itself is liable or if that liability should 
be placed on the operator.
As to the original question: If there is 
a mine/ERW accident in previously re-
leased land, who should be liable for the 
damage caused? The answer is: The state 
should be liable prior to and after land 
release, because it owes a duty of care to 
its citizens and visitors. It is a conflict of 
interest to have a national mine action 
authority investigating an accident that 
could determine that the state it forms 
part of is liable. In the final analysis, I 
posit the state is liable both prior to land 
release and after land release. 
See endnotes page 50
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